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Human Rights in the Post-September 11
Environment
Michael Posner1
Sixty years is a brief interlude in human history. Yet in that space of
time, the human rights movement—human rights organizations, other rights
advocates, governments, and international organizations—have made
incredible progress in norm-setting and in influencing how governments
treat people. In 1945, there was no universal recognition, for example, of
the “inalienable rights” of individuals to be free from torture or official
cruelty. Under Eleanor Roosevelt’s leadership, the United Nations (UN)
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, providing
universal rights standards on these and other fundamental subjects. Since
then, there has been substantial international attention on human rights
issues and a proliferation of treaties that spell out core human rights
standards. Today, as part of their diplomatic portfolio, many governments
recognize an obligation to ensure rights in their own societies and to work
collectively with others to secure basic rights around the world.
In the last fifteen years, there also has been a corresponding evolution of
an ambitious system of international enforcement systems. These include
international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda that were
created in the 1990s, as well as more recent special courts in places like
Sierra Leone and East Timor. In 1998, governments created the first
International Criminal Court, based in The Hague, to which more than one
hundred countries are now state parties.
On a parallel track, there has been an extraordinary proliferation of
nongovernmental human rights organizations around the world. Twentyfive years ago, there were a very small number of human rights
organizations outside of Western Europe and North America. But now the
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creation of these local human rights groups—in almost every country in the
world—has provided a powerful response to arguments by governments
that demands for respect for human rights are an improper interference by
outsiders in their domestic affairs. The world has come a long way toward
creating international baseline standards for the protection of human rights.
Yet today we face an unexpected challenge that threatens to undermine this
progress. It is the assertion by the U.S. government and others that, after
the September 11 attacks, the world has been engaged in a “global war
against terrorism” where international human rights rules simply do not
apply.
I will examine this premise and how the Bush Administration has applied
it in practice. Specifically, I will examine how this premise applies to the
detention and interrogation of so-called “unlawful enemy-combatants.” I
view the assertion of this new paradigm as a serious threat to the human
rights standards and enforcement mechanisms that have developed over the
last half-century. In response, I believe there is a pressing need to
aggressively challenge this approach in order to “hold the line” on what has
been accomplished since World War II.

I.

THE NEW NORMAL

The September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington D.C. led
to a range of new security measures and changed the human rights debate in
this country and around the world. The threats posed by groups like AlQaeda are real and significant. These groups are well-organized and wellfinanced. They intend to launch violent strikes aimed at civilians in the
U.S. and elsewhere. Governments have an obligation to provide security.
There are many things that the U.S. government has done well since
September 2001 to enhance security through measures that do not
jeopardize civil liberties and human rights. For example, protecting airports
and nuclear plants; strengthening front-line defenders such as police, fire,
and emergency medical people; creating a Director of National Intelligence;
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and the work of the 9/11 Commission. A number of recommendations that
the government has made in these and other areas are prudent, wise, and
within the bounds of law. These are things that I would call “rights
neutral,” and in policy terms, they are essential to security.
Unfortunately, the U.S. government and the Bush administration has also
engaged in a series of actions on a parallel track, and these actions have
dramatically changed the relationship between the government and its
people. The administration sometimes refers to these actions as the “new
normalcy.” Vice President Cheney used that term in late 2001, stating that
it reflects “an understanding of the world as it is.”2 In his view, and in those
of other senior administration officials, the idea is that: on one side there is
war, on the other side there is the law. And when fighting the “global war
on terrorism,” they assert that law becomes a luxury, not a necessity, that
socieities may no longer be able to afford. I will refer to these changes as
the “new normal” and I will outline its four key elements:
1.

Restriction on both openness of government and access to
information;

2.

Infringement on personal privacy;

3.

Discriminatory treatment of immigrants, minorities, and
noncitizens; and

4.

New rules governing the treatment of security detainees.

The administration’s “global war against terrorism” extends to the fifty
states and throughout the world. It has no time limits. The enemy is
vaguely defined. This is a radical framework that the administration
justifies by asserting that we are fighting a war against a new kind of
enemy, where the law is an impediment to the government’s ability to do
what needs to be done. They say, in essence, “trust us, we are doing the
right thing, and our actions will keep Americans safe.”
In a speech to the American Bar Association, Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales said that in the “war against terrorism,” criminal charges and trials
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are “neither necessary nor appropriate.”3 Mr. Gonzales has also stated that
as commander in chief, the president has the authority to override the laws
passed by Congress if he is acting in the name of national security.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has said that “different rules have to apply”
to the “enemy-combatants and terrorists who are being detained for acts of
war against our country.”4 Most recently, at the administration’s urging,
Congress established a military trial system that largely abandons the timetested military justice standards for fair trials.

II.

HOW DOES THIS PLAY OUT IN PRACTICE?

A. Openness in Government
Historically, a central premise of the U.S. system has been a presumption
that an informed citizenry needs information from government to make the
best decisions. Madison said that “popular Government, without popular
information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a
Tragedy; or, perhaps both.”5
This administration has turned that presumption on its head. The
administration believes that most actions bearing any relation to national
security must be kept secret. Governor Thomas Kean, who headed the 9/11
Commission, said that three-quarters of the classified documents that he
read in preparation for the Commission’s report should not have been
classified.6 A National Archives audit found that one-third of the records
re-classified by the CIA and other agencies in 2005 were wrongly kept
secret.7 The Government Accountability Office has criticized Department
of Defense classification procedures as being inconsistent and lacking
oversight.8 Former Senate leader Trent Lott has urged an independent
board to overhaul the current classification system.9 This administration is
not only keeping information from the public, it is keeping information
from people whose job it is to make the law.
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B. Personal Privacy
The law regulating the executive branch’s authority to pry into
Americans’ private lives has changed dramatically since September 11.
These changes have raised fears that bedrock principles of personal privacy
and presumptive innocence (e.g., the Fourth Amendment) have been
replaced with a new normal of widespread surveillance and generalized
suspicion.
In 2001, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act. It allows broad
federal police power for wire taps, access to information, library records,
and the like.10 And the administration has exceeded this broad surveillance
authority provided by Congress. It has used electronic surveillance to
record the conversations of persons within the United States11 and has
collected potentially millions of domestic phone records without obtaining
the court order required by law.12 In September 2006, the House of
Representatives approved a bill that, if passed into law, would not only
permit unrestricted retention and use of communications of U.S. citizens
obtained without a warrant, it would also grant new authority for
warrantless surveillance of a wide range of domestic and international calls
involving U.S. citizens.13
C. Treatment of Foreigners, Minorities, and Noncitizens
In times of crisis or war, the first groups targeted are usually foreigners,
noncitizens, and minorities. This has been true throughout U.S. history,
beginning with the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798. It was true in the
1850s, when the Know Nothing Party attacked Catholics, Jews, refugees,
and foreigners. It was true after World War I, when the Mitchell Palmer
raids focused on foreigners. It was true during World War II, with the
Japanese internments. And it is true today, when Muslim Americans and
individuals from the Middle East and South Asia are targeted, officially and
unofficially.
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Initially, after the September 11 attacks, the Justice Department detained
more than twelve hundred people without charge and without a rational
basis.14 A two hundred-page Justice Department internal study written by
the inspector general strongly condemned both the abusive treatment of
these groups of people and the basis for their arrests.15
In 2002, the administration announced a re-registration program through
which young Muslim men—men from twenty-five different countries who
were living in the United States—were forced to be fingerprinted and
questioned by U.S. immigration officials. Many were detained. Eightythree thousand people went through this re-registration process.16 The
government has not reported a single bit of intelligence that came to light as
a result of this—a program intended to help protect American national
security.17
Eventually, after much controversy, the program was
18
disbanded. But it caused enormous upset and distrust within the affected
communities.
In spring of 2006, Congress considered a number of wide-ranging
immigration proposals as part of a “comprehensive reform” initiative.19
The House of Representatives approved a bill that, if passed into law, would
expand the executive branch’s authority to detain noncitizens; would give
government officials power to make secret immigration determinations;
would criminalize individuals present in the United States who lack proper
documentation; and would authorize local law enforcement personnel to
enforce federal immigration law.20
Overseas refugee admissions into the United States have decreased
significantly. Almost fifty-four thousand people were admitted as refugees
last year,21 compared with over one hundred thousand in 1990,22 and as
many as two hundred thousand in the early 1980s.23 As of October 2005,
only 32,900 people applied for asylum,24 compared to 63,230 applications
four years ago.25 One important reason is that asylum seekers are being
detained and face the prospect of months, or even years, in jail before their
cases are resolved. In addition, in May 2005, Congress also passed the Real

PRISON AND DETENTION

Human Rights in the Post-September 11 Environment 187

ID Act, which, among other things, makes it more difficult for people to
seek political asylum in this country.26 It creates a series of new restrictions
that are justified by national security concerns.
D. Security Detentions and Interrogations
A fourth broad category of the “new normal” is security detentions and
interrogation practices. There have been two important cases involving
security detainees who are American citizens—Yasser Hamdi and Jose
Padilla. Each was held in military detention in the United States as enemycombatants—without a lawyer, without charge, and without trial. The
Supreme Court essentially overthrew Hamdi’s detention, and eventually he
was allowed to go to Saudi Arabia after more than two years in detention.27
Padilla, an American citizen arrested at O’Hare airport, was held in
detention for more than three years without being charged or tried. For two
years he had no lawyer. In November 2005, before the Supreme Court had
the opportunity to review the legality of his military detention, the federal
government indicted Padilla on crimes unrelated to terrorist plots within the
United States and transferred him to civilian custody.28
Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri, a Qatar student, is now the lone enemycombatant on U.S. soil. The FBI arrested him on fraud charges in
December 2002. In June 2003, just weeks before his planned trial, the
administration declared Al-Marri an “enemy-combatant” in the war on
terror. Al-Marri is still being held in military custody, without charge or
trial, and has had limited access to his attorneys. Al-Marri’s petition for
writ of habeas corpus is now proceeding.29
Outside of the continental United States, there are more than fourteen
thousand people being held by Americans in detention centers30—
approximately 450 at Guantanamo,31 and approximately 500 in
Afghanistan.32 There are fourteen thousand detainees in Iraq.33
Over the last five years, some senior administration officials have been
unwilling to accept the application of international legal standards
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prohibiting cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of these detainees. A
2002 memo from the White House said that the Geneva Conventions did
not apply in Afghanistan, including Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, which requires humane treatment.34 The memo then extended
that same blanket exception to foreign fighters in Iraq. Pursuant to a
presidential order, the military began trying detainees at Guantanamo Bay
in military commissions that failed to protect the accused’s right to a fair
trial.
In 2002, officials in the Office of Legal Counsel at the Justice
Department, including John Yoo and Jay Bybee, wrote memos that
essentially redefined the term torture to mean the equivalence of organ
failure, serious bodily injury, or even death.35 They defined torture not to
include cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, which meant that abusive
interrogation techniques would be legally used and acceptable in
Guantanamo.
At the end of 2002, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld decided to change
military rules on interrogation.36 A Pentagon working group proposed
thirty-five methods of coercive interrogations.
Secretary Rumsfeld
37
endorsed twenty-four of them. His modified rules for interrogations at
Guantanamo later migrated to Afghanistan and Iraq. These new rules allow
interrogators to subject detainees to sleep deprivation, use of dogs, stress
positions, and the like.
Not surprisingly, the combination of illegal detention and interrogation
practices has led to serious abuses.
The Pentagon has initiated
approximately eight hundred investigations into these abuses.38 According
to a report by Human Rights First, close to one hundred people have died in
U.S. custody; the Pentagon classifies thirty-four of those cases as criminal
homicides.39 At least eight of these people were literally tortured to death.
Only twelve deaths resulted in any kind of punishment for those
perpetrating the abuse.40 Of the thirty-four cases being investigated as
criminal homicides, none occurred at Guantanamo, and only one at Abu
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Ghraib. These numbers reflect a serious crisis, and many of the architects
of these policies are still in senior positions in government.
These abuses prompted Congress to explicitly prohibit any cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment of detainees in the form of the Detainee
Treatment Act. Sponsored by Senator John McCain in 2005, it passed both
Houses of Congress by overwhelming margins.41 But when President Bush
signed the bill into law, he included a signing statement that purports to
leave open the possibility that members of the executive branch could still
authorize cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of detainees.42
The U.S. courts have also been highly skeptical of the administration’s
broad assertions of executive power and its approach to detention and
interrogation policies. In June 2006, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions,
which requires humane treatment, applies to all individuals in U.S.
detention, regardless of their status. The Court also held that the president
lacked the authority to establish military commissions without
Congressional authorization and that the commissions he had created in late
2001 violated the law of war. 43
Following the Court’s decision in Hamdan, the U.S. military took a
number of good faith steps to implement the ruling. In September 2006, the
army issued its new field manual on interrogations, a document that is
largely consistent with international law principles and that embraces the
Geneva Conventions standards. The adoption of this new field manual
represents a victory for those in the military who have struggled to return to
the rule of law.44
More troubling was the administration’s broader response to the Hamdan
decision. At the urging of the administration, Congress passed the Military
Commissions Act of 2006. It is a sweeping law that, among other things,
creates a new system of military commissions to try some of those detained
as illegal enemy-combatants in the “global war on terrorism.”
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On the plus side, Congress refused to grant the president authority to
redefine the humane treatment requirements of Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions, despite intense executive-branch pressure. Those
requirements—which provide both fair-trial protections and basic standards
of humane treatment—remain intact, and all U.S. personnel must comply
with them.
But the new law also contains a number of deeply disturbing provisions,
such as the creation of a new legal definition of “unlawful enemycombatant.” This new definition blurs the most fundamental distinction
between combatants and noncombatants. The definition of “unlawful
enemy-combatant” is so broad and vague that it could encompass U.S.
citizens picked up in the United States as well as people who have not
engaged directly in any hostilities against the United States. The
administration has long argued that the entire world is a battlefield in a new
kind of war paradigm.
Additionally, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 seeks to strip away a
key “check” on executive-branch compliance with U.S. and international
law: the ability of the courts to hear challenges to detention via the writ of
habeas corpus and through civil lawsuits. The Act also explicitly seeks to
prevent courts from hearing claims of violations of the Geneva
Conventions.
III.

THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Throughout the five years of debate on these issues, some senior
administration officials have created a hostile environment in which being
critical of the administration’s policies is unpatriotic. When John Ashcroft
testified to the Senate Judiciary Committee in December 2001, he referred,
in inflammatory terms, to persons engaged in debate regarding rights versus
security:
to those who pit Americans against immigrants, and citizens
against non-citizens; to those who scare peace-loving people with
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phantoms of lost liberty; my message is this: Your tactics only aid
terrorists—for they erode our national unity and diminish our
resolve. They give ammunition to America’s enemies, and pause
to America’s friends. They encourage people of good will to
remain silent in the face of evil.45
Other senior administration officials and their allies also have sought to
silence this debate by attacking the messengers. When the New York Times
released information on the government’s surveillance of bank records, the
chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, Peter King, called
for criminal prosecution of the newspaper.46 When critics of administration
policies within the government leaked reports of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)—first on Abu Ghraib, then on
Guantanamo—administration officials and their allies in the news media
fiercely attacked the credibility of the ICRC. The Wall Street Journal, for
example, called the ICRC “an ideological organization unable to distinguish
between good guys and bad . . . no longer careful, scrupulous and neutral.”47
And within an hour of Senator Debbie Stabenow’s (D-MI) vote in favor of
the Specter Amendment, which maintained detainees’ rights to challenge
their detention in U.S. courts (through a writ of habeas corpus), the National
Republican Senatorial Committee issued a statement declaring she had
“sided with trial lawyers and terrorists instead of common sense . . .
Stabenow’s continued incompetence when it comes to keeping America
safe is staggering.”48
IV.

THE WAY FORWARD

A. Working with New Allies
These issues of national security are part of a much larger and very
polarized political debate in the United States. In order to change this
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dynamic, those of us who seek to restore basic human rights norms need to
go beyond traditional lines of alliance. We and others have begun this
process by enlisting those we call “unlikely allies” or “strange bedfellows.”
One of the most important developments for Human Rights First has
been our growing relationships with retired senior U.S. military leaders.
These senior military leaders are as upset about the administration’s
detention and interrogation policies as any group in this country. They
understand the corrosive effect of these policies, perhaps better than any of
us. The military lives by discipline and a chain of command. When senior
Pentagon officials essentially tell the military to “take the gloves off,” the
result is that it makes it impossible for good commanders and leaders in the
military to ensure discipline and respect for rules and law that are essential
to the military’s effectiveness.
Human Rights First has now identified and is working closely with more
than forty former senior military officers—retired admirals and generals—
who have joined us in challenging various aspects of the administration’s
policies. In the summer of 2003, when Human Rights First issued a report
on secret detentions that identified about twenty-five U.S. run facilities
where representatives of the ICRC have no access,49 we helped coordinate
the drafting of a public letter by eight retired U.S. admirals and generals
denouncing the use of such facilities.
When Alberto Gonzales was nominated as Attorney General, thirteen
flag and field officers, including General John Shalikashvili, a former head
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed grave concerns about Mr. Gonzales’
views on the Geneva Conventions and coercive interrogations; those
officers articulated their concerns in an open letter to the Senate Judiciary
Committee in January 2005.50 In October 2005, when the McCain
Amendment—banning the use of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment by any U.S. personnel anywhere in the world—was
being debated, we coordinated a letter to Senator McCain in support of his
amendment, and that letter was signed by twenty-nine retired military
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leaders. A few months later, in January 2006, when President Bush signed
the McCain Amendment into law, twenty-two retired military leaders
signed a letter to the president urging commitment to its implementation. In
September 2006, we coordinated a letter from almost fifty admirals and
generals, including five former heads of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, urging the
Senate Armed Services Committee not to adopt the proposed legislation
redefining Common Article 3 in a way that violated the core principles of
the Geneva Conventions.51 The final legislation adopted by the Senate and
House rejected the administration’s proposal to redefine the humane
treatment standards of Common Article 3, making it clear that subjecting
detainees to treatment that involves serious physical or mental pain or
suffering is a war crime.52
In our view, in order for these and related efforts to be successful, it is
important to engage and involve people who have been strong supporters of
President Bush’s Iraq war policies. Some of our critics charge that the
concerns about Abu Ghraib, detention practices, and Guantanamo are only
coming from people who are opposed to the war in Iraq—it is very
important for us to separate these two issues. It is possible to be a supporter
of the president’s policies on Iraq, and other foreign policy issues, and yet
strongly oppose the torture and mistreatment of prisoners.
B. Reinforcing International Norms
In addressing these issues going forward, it also is critical that we
reinforce international human rights norms. The administration has
challenged international law on a number of issues. The international
community needs to respond forcefully to the administration’s violations to
ensure that core international human rights protections are maintained.
One area where these principles are being tested relates to the
extraterritorial application of U.S. treaty law. Another area of concern
relates to detention. This is an area where international law is less clear and
one where we have to find common language and a common strategy.
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Another grey area is minimum due process standards in security cases.
What are these standards in criminal cases? And what is the applicability of
the Geneva Conventions, particularly in places like the detention centers in
Afghanistan and Guantanamo, where the administration has declared
everyone an “enemy-combatant”? The administration’s view is that the
Geneva Conventions are irrelevant in these cases, but in Hamdan the
Supreme Court has held that Common Article 3 applies. We need to
address all of these issues and reinforce the importance of adhering to
international law and institutions.
C. An Affirmative Agenda
We also need to develop a stronger agenda for challenging extremist
violence. It is incumbent upon the human rights movement not only to rally
against government excesses; we must also find ways to combat these
violent attacks against civilians as crimes. One way to do so is through the
United Nations, which has been considering a draft Comprehensive
Convention Against Terrorism for a number of years. There are thirteen
derivative conventions dealing with terrorist acts, all of which refer back to
the Comprehensive Convention.53 The Comprehensive Convention is
stalemated largely because governments cannot agree on a definition of
terrorism.54 Ultimately, it may not be possible to overcome this impasse.
But as a starting point, any definition of terrorism should encompass actions
that are intended to cause bodily harm to civilians for the purpose of
intimidating a population or to force governments to act or not act.
I think it is important for the human rights community to help define acts
of terrorism as crimes. We should encourage governments and international
tribunals to prosecute terrorist acts, subject to an internationally agreed
upon definition.
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V.

CONCLUSION

The erosion of core human rights standards in the United States is having
profound and troubling effects around the world. Repressive governments
in places like Zimbabwe, Egypt, China, and Russia increasingly cite the
new “American model” of detention and interrogation in order to justify
their own actions.55 The world is closely watching to see how the United
States responds to the challenges posed by this erosion of civil liberties in
our own society.
Thirty years ago, Justice William Douglas wrote to a group of young
lawyers in the State of Washington. Unfortunately, his comments seem
particularly apt today. He wrote: “As nightfall does not all come at once,
neither does oppression. In both instances, there is a twilight when
everything remains seemingly unchanged. And it is in such twilight that we
all must be most aware of change in the air—however slight—lest we
become unwitting victims of the darkness.”56
Today we find ourselves in the twilight, and it is incumbent upon all of us
to respond in whatever ways we can to fend off the darkness. I am an
optimist and believe that we can, and will, correct our course. But to do so,
all of us must be ready to play an active role and challenge those who seek
to fundamentally change our constitutional system—a system of which we
are so rightfully proud.
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